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At the 39-minute mark of his 2015 
State of the Union Address, President Obama 
turned to the balcony and officially welcomed 
the most famous of that evening’s guests. 
Alan Gross, a thin, pale man, stood and 
mouthed his gratitude to the President as the 
most powerful deliberative body in the world 
applauded his presence. Gross’s freedom 
represented the early stages of the 
administration’s push to reform the 50 year old 
status quo between the United States and the 
communist island just 90 miles south of its 
shores.  
The U.S.’s stance towards Cuba has 
historically used rhetoric about the lack of civil 
liberties, dictatorship, and security to defend 
the embargo put in place during the 1960s. 
Politicians of the era viewed communism in 
Cuba as an immediate threat that had to be 
snuffed out before it could infect the entire 
hemisphere. Their hope was that by isolating 
the island, Cuba’s citizens would be 
compelled to fight for reform and institute their 
own democracy. That approach, however, has 
backfired entirely. Neither government is 
innocent — Cuba’s human rights record 
remains as poor as ever and the U.S. has 
almost singlehandedly destroyed the country’s 
economy and health system. Though guilt is 
shared, the U.S. alone controls the 
relationship’s future. Reforms are in their 
infancy, but in light of the turbulent past, there 
has been progress. 
* * * 
Having successfully won control of the 
country from U.S.-backed President Fulgencio 
Batista, Fidel Castro officially came to power 
on Jan. 1, 1959. His government immediately 
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began nationalizing private property, land, and 
private companies, regardless of whether 
owners were foreign or domestic. At the time, 
businesses from the U.S. had the largest 
presence in Cuba and were integral to the 
nation’s economy — the U.S. held 75 percent 
of the island’s arable land and 90 percent of 
its utilities, including infrastructure, electrical 
services and telephone systems.1 Most 
importantly to the Cuban government, 
however, the U.S. held the keys to two critical 
industries: sugar, which Cuba had in 
abundance, and oil refineries, which Cuba 
desperately needed. Half of the sugar industry 
in Cuba was owned by the U.S., making it 
difficult to export the product without the 
assistance of the Americans because they 
controlled the production sources. Similarly, 
all three of the country’s oil refineries were 
operated by American companies, forcing 
Cubans to go through them in order to import 
and process oil. These predicaments collided 
in the summer of 1960, when a trade 
agreement was made with the Soviet Union to 
exchange Cuban sugar for Soviet crude.2 
However, fearing Soviet influence in its 
hemisphere, the U.S. refused to process any 
of the incoming oil. In response, Castro 
nationalized the American refineries, 
effectively pushing the U.S. out of its position 
as gatekeeper. 
 From here, the relationship between 
the U.S. and Cuba deteriorated rather quickly. 
The U.S. demanded compensation for the 
seized assets — Cuba refused. A 1960 memo 
from the U.S. Department of State advised 
that any line of action towards Cuba should 
make “the greatest inroads in denying money 
and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary 
and real wages, to bring about hunger, 
desperation and overthrow of government”.3 
This plan was implemented in October 1960, 
when a partial embargo barring all exports to 
the island except for food and medicine was 
placed on Cuba. President Eisenhower cut all 
remaining diplomatic relations the following 
January. The embargo was expanded to 
include imports to the U.S. from Cuba in 
February 1962, cutting out the valuable 
American market. Following the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, President Kennedy banned U.S. 
citizens from travelling to Cuba in October 
1962.4 While the loss of export profits and 
tourism revenue was intended to crush the 
Cuban economy, the country’s Soviet allies 
minimized the damage by providing oil 
subsidies and a new market for Cuban 
exports. Eastern Europe replaced the U.S. as 
Cuba’s chief partner and the embargo 
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became more symbolic than functional. 
Cuba’s economy adjusted to meet the 
demands of the Kremlin while relations with 
the U.S. essentially froze. Few lasting 
changes occurred on either side until the 
1990s, when the Soviet Union fell and its 
support vanished. Cuba was plunged into “the 
Special Period” — the worst depression in its 
history — from which it has yet to fully 
recover. 
 It was at this point that the U.S. 
significantly tightened its sanctions by passing 
the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (or CDA), 
which prohibited trade with foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Prior to the 
passage of CDA, Cuba annually imported 
$719 million worth of goods through U.S. 
subsidiary companies. Of this, 90 percent was 
food and medicine. This dropped to $300,000 
once CDA was enacted, further damaging the 
country’s already crippled economy and ability 
to care for its people.5 Like the original 
sanctions, CDA was intended to increase 
pressure on the Cuban government during a 
weak period in the hopes of finally breaking 
the communist regime, but Castro once again 
resisted. 
Things further escalated on Feb. 24, 
1996. That day, two planes operated by 
members of Brothers to the Rescue, a 
nonprofit group formed by Cuban exiles 
looking to rescue refugee rafts, were flying 
towards Cuban airspace when they were shot 
down. The attackers were two Cuban Air 
Force jets, which, according to radio 
transcripts, were aware the planes were 
civilian in nature.6 Brothers to the Rescue had 
previously been warned by the Cuban 
government to keep its distance following 
several trips to airdrop anti-Castro leaflets.  
Nonetheless, the American public was furious, 
and political leaders from both major parties 
called for increased restrictions. These calls 
for retaliation pushed Congress to pass the 
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act 
of 1995 (better known as the Helms-Burton 
Act) on Mar. 12, 1996. Prior to the act’s 
passage, the embargo had been merely an 
executive order under the control of the 
President, but Helms-Burton formally codified 
the embargo into law.  
Alteration of the embargo now required 
both the approval of the President and an act 
of Congress, and guidelines for such removal 
were set incredibly high. Not only does Cuba 
have to release all political prisoners and 
dissolve its governmental police force, it must 
take steps to return, or compensate for, any 
American assets confiscated after Jan. 1, 
1959. There must also be free elections held 
in the country, overseen by independent 
observers, and if either Fidel or Raul Castro is 
involved in the proceedings in any way, the 
government will remain unsupported.7 Aside 
from providing the embargo with a legal 
structure, Helms-Burton intensified the 
harshness of the embargo by expanding its 
scope to include international sanctions. 
Under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act, 
American companies and individuals can sue 
foreign entities that have profited from trade 
with Cuba in any product made in, including 
parts from or patented in the U.S. If the judge 
finds in favor of the plaintiff, the foreign 
business can be totally banned from trading 
with the U.S. and the leadership of the 
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business may be barred from entering the 
country.8 With this stipulation, the Helms-
Burton Act forces foreign companies 
unconnected to the embargo to choose 
between the American and Cuban markets.  
The former is a massive, capitalistic state; the 
latter can barely feed its people. For most, 
there really is no choice of who to 
accommodate. 
However, this provision has stoked the 
international community’s condemnation of 
the embargo. The Council of Europe, the 
European Union, Canada, China, the United 
Kingdom — virtually every major trade partner 
of the U.S. — have continuously condemned 
the law since its inception.9 Even before the 
passage of Helms-Burton, though, the 
embargo was extremely unpopular outside the 
U.S. Every year since 1992, the United 
Nations General Assembly has voted on a 
resolution condemning the Cuban embargo. In 
1992, it passed with 59 votes in favor and only 
three votes against. Conversely, both the 
2013 and 2014 votes saw 188 countries vote 
in favor of the resolution, with only the U.S. 
itself and Israel voting in dissent.10 With years 
of international consensus against it, the 
embargo’s preservation has become more of 
a diplomatic embarrassment than a hard 
statement in support of democracy. 
Ever since its inception, U.S. 
authorities have insisted that the embargo is 
necessary to promoting human rights and 
democratic change for the island. In spite of 
this assertion, there has been no significant 
decrease in Cuba’s human rights violations 
since the introduction of the policy. There 
were nearly 7,200 reports of arbitrary 
detention made to the Cuban Commission for 
Human Rights and National Reconciliation 
(CCDHRN) in 2014 alone. Comparatively, 
CCDHRN reviewed only 2,900 such cases in 
2013 and 1,100 in 2010.11 While these 
detentions are generally short in duration, the 
scope of them is troubling. Having interviewed 
a collection of former political prisoners in 
2010, Human Rights Watch reported that the 
country’s prisons are severely overcrowded 
and full of malnourished inmates forced to 
fulfill manual labor requirements in 12 hour 
shifts. However, the Cuban government 
denies any international human rights groups 
access to its prison system. It’s not surprising, 
then, that Freedom House, a non-
governmental organization that scores nations 
based on support of free expression, rates 
Cuba as the only unfree nation in the 
Americas. In 2014, they gave Cuba’s press 
freedom a 90, 100 being the worst oppression 
possible, and noted that private ownership of 
electronic media is totally prohibited. All media 
outlets are owned by the government and 
what limited internet access is available is 
closely monitored.12 These practices clearly 
don’t fall in line with the U.S.’s expressed 
goals, but, after 54 long years, it has remained 
this way. The embargo hasn’t only failed to 
force the Castro government into complying 
with standards for human rights, but the 
violations of those rights have only increased. 
Aside from failing to create change, the 
embargo has also stunted the ability of Cuban 
citizens to access basic necessities, harming 
them more than helping. 
By far, the element of Cuban society 
most damaged by the embargo has been 
public health. At the embargo’s onset, the 
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Soviet Union provided Cuba with strong 
enough financial support that it could maintain 
stability despite the sanctions. Life expectancy 
rose 12 years during the first three decades of 
the embargo, placing Cuba above wealthier 
countries in South America and the 
Caribbean. However, once the Soviet Union 
fell in 1989, that stability faltered. By that 
point, Cuba had been producing more than 80 
percent of its pharmaceuticals with chemicals 
provided by the Soviets and other European 
entities.13 With the loss of the oil-for-sugar 
agreement between the island and the Soviet 
Union, the economy crashed, and the 
passage of the Helms-Burton Act caused 
foreign investment to fade away quickly. Cuba 
was left without a source of chemical 
resources to produce medicine and a severe 
lack of food. A study conducted by the 
American Association for World Health 
estimated that, between 1989 and 1993, the 
daily caloric intake dropped by 40 percent 
among adults. Infant mortality, which had 
steadily declined for over a decade, increased 
by 13 percent in one year. Lack of medication 
resulted in a 48 percent increase in 
tuberculosis deaths between 1992 and 1993, 
and without chlorine to clean water, Cuban 
supplies of safe drinking water dwindled.14 
The U.S. government observed this 
happening and did absolutely nothing. Not 
only did it fail to act, it forbade others from 
doing so by threatening their economic 
security. In fact, CDA’s ban on subsidiary 
trade was passed, suddenly, during the most 
severe period of the crisis. Cuba continues to 
face a lack of access to basic medical 
supplies, a majority of which are patented in 
the U.S. and thus inaccessible. Most medicine 
produced outside the U.S. costs Cuba an 
estimated 30 percent more than American 
drugs would and carry 50 to 400 percent 
increases in shipping rates, limiting 
importation to only the most severely needed 
products.15 Nevertheless, public health 
provisions in Cuba have improved 
dramatically due to an increased focus by the 
Castro government. Cuba has managed to 
easily surpass the U.S. in physician density, 
boasting 67 doctors for every 10,000 people in 
2010, while the U.S. had only 24. The island 
nation also matches the U.S.’s life expectancy 
of 79 and beats its infant mortality rate, 
accomplishing all of this while spending one 
20th per patient as the U.S.16, 17 This growth 
has translated into economic benefits thanks 
to deals with Brazil and Venezuela, which 
trade heavily subsidized oil for Cuban 
physicians and medical training. The past 
thirty years have also seen several medical 
breakthroughs in Cuba, including a vaccine for 
meningitis B and a cure for the blindness-
causing disease retinitis pigmentosa.18 But 
due to its own sanctions, the U.S. has been 
unable to acquire these treatments — it wasn’t 
until 2014 that an American version of the 
vaccine was developed, despite it having 
existed since the 1980s a few miles south. 
Calling the embargo anything less than a 
human rights violation in and of itself would be 
difficult, but labeling it as strategically effective 
in any way is simply a denial of reality. 
 The economic burden that the U.S. 
has placed on itself is far more extensive than 
the loss of a few medical treatments, however. 
In a 2009 letter to then President-elect 
Obama, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
12 leading business organizations advocated 
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for the removal of the embargo, arguing that it 
costs the U.S. $1.2 billion each year. When 
accounting for lost sales and other economic 
output, that number rises to more than $3.6 
billion annually.19 These figures do not 
account for the money spent by the Treasury 
Department to enforce the embargo, nor do 
they include the costs faced by the 
government when litigating violators of tourism 
restrictions. In terms of individual businesses, 
Johns Hopkins University has found that 
potential trade with Cuba is as high as $2 
billion.20 That same study listed the lost 
revenue of Cuban businesses as only half that 
— a clear indication that American businesses 
are feeling the brunt of the embargo launched 
by their own country. These projections have 
estimated that if trade relations were 
normalized, U.S. exports to Cuba could reach 
as high as $4.3 billion annually, particularly in 
the agricultural and technology industries.21 
While individual Cubans have extremely 
limited buying power, the country’s economy 
has gradually opened into the private sector, 
so there is potential to be tapped in new, 
growing businesses. In 2000, President 
Clinton signed the Trade Sanction Reform and 
Export Enhancement Act, which allowed for 
cash-only purchases of certain agricultural 
products by Cuba. During the first year of 
these changes, $4.3 million worth of food was 
exported to Cuba, and as of 2014, that 
number had increased to over $291 million, 
with a peak of $710 million in 2007. Cuba now 
places amongst the U.S.’s top 50 export 
markets, based solely on sales of these 
limited commodities, and has since the policy 
was introduced.22 Relaxing the sanctions on 
Cuba has already been shown to help both 
parties, yet other American industries remain 
unable to expand.  
There is also the issue of oil reserves 
in the Cuban regions of the Gulf of Mexico, 
which the Energy Information Administration 
lists as containing 124 million barrels as of 
January 2015.23 As it stands, companies from 
Russia, China and Spain have gotten a head 
start on attempts to access the crude, while 
American interests wait. By continuing to 
block its own corporations from trading with 
one of the closest markets available, the U.S. 
is stunting the, albeit limited, growth of its own 
economy with nothing to show for it. 
 Not only has potential money been 
missed, but funding has been outright wasted 
in service of the policy. Radio y Television 
Martí is a radio and television station based in 
Miami, Florida that broadcasts to Cuba 24 
hours a day and demonstrates the most 
bizarre example of this waste. The station is 
financed with taxpayer dollars through the 
Broadcasting Board of Governors, running 
daily news programs that present information 
about Cuba from the perspective of the U.S. 
government. Every year, it operates on a 
guaranteed budget of $27 million. There are 
only two problems. Firstly, it has been 
continuously labeled as propaganda since its 
inception; a 2007 survey found that only 38 
percent of people felt the television 
programming was at all objective, and that 
number dropped to 29 percent in regards to 
the radio broadcasts.24 The other issue is that 
Cuba jams almost every word the station 
sends out, and a 2010 report from the 
Committee on Foreign Relations found that 
less than 2 percent of people in Cuba had 
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ever listened in or knew of its existence, as 
most listeners happen to be Cubans living in 
southern Florida. In all, $864 million dollars 
have gone into the program.25 By all accounts, 
it’s a complete waste of money, but Congress 
refuses to shut down Radio y Television Martí, 
rejecting multiple bills to defund it.26 
 Congressional inactivity towards Cuba 
is arguably by design, with the standards for 
repealing the embargo being set so high to 
ensure that change would occur before it was 
removed. Consequently, change has been 
largely restricted to diplomatic adjustments on 
the part of the president. Until the election of 
President Obama, plans have focused almost 
entirely upon what to do once Fidel Castro 
dies rather than actively attempting to amend 
policies. In 2009, however, what became 
known as “the Cuban Thaw” began. That 
year, the president eased economic sanctions 
and removed travel restrictions so that 
families with relatives in Cuba could legally 
visit the island. President Obama also lifted 
restrictions that prevented 
telecommunications companies from 
operating in Cuba, the hope being that 
expanded internet access would help 
nonprofits and humanitarian groups in Cuba 
coordinate with American allies.27 Following a 
series of talks brokered by Canada and Pope 
Francis earlier that year, December 2014 saw 
the announcement of an official plan to 
normalize relations between the two countries. 
In a speech broadcast on Cuban television, 
President Raúl Castro addressed the new 
deal:  
President Obama’s decision 
deserves the respect and 
recognition of our people … We 
have agreed upon the 
restoration of diplomatic 
relations. This doesn’t mean 
that the principle issue has 
been solved. The economic, 
commercial and financial 
blockade, which causes 
enormous human and 
economic harm to our country, 
must stop.28 
The agreement included the release of Alan 
Gross, imprisoned in Cuba since 2011, and 
Rolando Trujillo, who had been imprisoned for 
nearly 20 years, in addition to the release of 
53 Cuban political prisoners.29 President 
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Obama also announced his intention to open 
an embassy in Havana and shared Castro’s 
call for Congress to finally lift the embargo. 
These steps represented a major step 
forward, but the issue of congressional 
approval remains a large hurdle. 
 The issue doesn’t fall along party lines 
as well as other foreign policy questions, with 
both Republicans and Democrats praising and 
blasting the moves. A poll conducted in 
January 2015 found that 74 percent of 
Democrats and 67 percent of independents 
support normalization and the removal of the 
embargo.30 For Republicans, there is much 
more opposition towards the plan, but it is far 
from universal — 40 percent said that they 
would support normalization, with that number 
rising significantly among younger voters. 
Despite the party divide, it’s undeniable that 
support in the public exists: overall, 66 percent 
of those polled wanted an end to the 54-year-
old embargo.31 
Currently, the only major voice of 
dissent among Democrats in Congress is Sen. 
Bob Menendez (D-NJ), but in light of his 
removal as the Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and 
investigation against him based on charges of 
bribery, it’s unclear how much support he 
could muster from his party. Amongst 
Republicans, there has been significant 
pushback from Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and 
Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), as well as a long 
list of House members. Nevertheless, Sen. 
Jeff Flake (R-AZ) has long been a proponent 
of reestablishing ties, and Sen. Rand Paul (R-
KY) has also lent his support, writing: “Let’s 
overwhelm the Castro regime with iPhones, 
iPads, American cars, and American 
ingenuity.”32 Both have said that they expect 
their peers to come around before long.  
That being said, it’s highly improbable 
that the current Congress would be willing to 
make such a large policy shift. Helms-Burton 
requires that Cuba pay back almost $7 billion 
in seized American assets before the 
embargo can be lifted, so Congress would 
need to repeal or significantly amend the law 
in order to move ahead.33 There would also 
need to be funding for any new embassy from 
the deeply red House of Representatives and 
confirmation of a new U.S. Ambassador to 
Cuba by the GOP-controlled Senate. This 
would all take time and effort that such 
tentative bipartisanship is unlikely to provide. 
President Obama has demonstrated a 
willingness to move ahead of Congress on 
this issue, but without legislative change, any 
of his actions could easily be overturned by a 
future administration. The interests of the 
Cuban government must also be considered. 
Since the deal’s announcement, the Castro 
regime has demanded a number of 
concessions, such as the removal of Cuba 
from the list of terrorist-supporting states and 
the return of Guantanamo Bay to Cuban 
control, which have threatened to derail the 
negotiations.34, 35    
Obviously, the Cuban government 
cannot be excused for its outright oppression, 
but dropping the embargo, U.S.’s very own, 
very public violation, isn’t an endorsement of 
these activities. Similarly, reevaluating a policy 
that has clearly failed is more a gesture of 
pragmatism than one of capitulation. Isolating 
the Cuban people has made it impossible for 
18 
 
them to effectively build the infrastructure to 
force governmental reforms. These 
hypothetical reforms being the singular goal of 
the embargo yet remaining unrealized half a 
century later, the policy can no longer be 
defended. President Obama has begun to 
construct a framework for normalized 
relations, but to actualize this attempt at 
progress, Congress must drop its now-hollow 
crusade. In accordance with the original State 
Department recommendation, supplies have 
been denied, while plenty of hunger and 
desperation have been felt — all that’s 
missing is any positive result. 
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